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1 The Special Composition Question and Some
Physics-Based Answers
What are the necessary and sufficient conditions under which a set1 of material
objects S composes something? In other words: what is the criterion—i.e. a
condition that is both sufficient and necessary—ψ such that:
ψ(S) iff the objects in set S compose (Comp) an object x: ∃x(Comp(S, x))?
This is a version of the so called Special Composition Question (SCQ). SCQ was
famously introduced in the metaphysics literature by Van Inwagen (1987),2 and
it has been driving the debate on composition ever since. Answers to SCQ can
be broadly divided in two camps: extreme or moderate answers.3 According
to extreme answers ψ is irrelevant for composition: either composition always
occurs, i.e. a set S of entities composes a further entity under any ψ whatsoever
(mereological universalism), or composition never occurs, i.e. a set of entities
S composes a further entity under no ψ whatsoever (mereological nihilism).4
Moderate answers single out a non-empty and non-trivial criterion ψ—one that
neither fails for every S, nor holds for every S—for composition to occur. De-
spite their initial attractiveness, satisfactory moderate answers are hard to come
by.5 Recently, different physics-based answers to the SCQ have been put forward
1I use set-theory, rather than, e.g. plural logic, because McKenzie and Muller (2017)—the
main target of the paper—uses set-theory.
2See also Van Inwagen (1990).
3I leave aside Brutalism. According to Brutalism—to put it roughly—there is no non-
trivial principled answer to the SCQ. Wheter some entities compose a further entity is a brute
fact. For a defense, see Markosian (1998).
4This is rough. In effect, given the orthodox definition of composition, a singleton set
does not compose a further object, even under mereological universalism. For a defense of
mereological universalism see e.g. Lewis (1986). For a defense of mereological nihilism see,
e.g. Sider (2013).
5See Van Inwagen (1990).
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in the literature. This is a much welcome development. Metaphysical consider-
ations should be sensitive to insights from empirical sciences. The main focus
of this paper will be on the so-called Bound State Answer (BSA), suggested
in McKenzie (2011), and recently advocated in McKenzie and Muller (2017),
and Waechter and Ladyman (2019). However, before we enter into some of its
details, it is worth introducing another physics-based answer, namely the en-
tanglement answer. The reason for that will be clear in due course.6 Roughly,
according to the latter, a set S of material objects composes a further entity iff
the members of S are entangled—thus, ψ is “being entangled”.7 The entangle-
ment answer, which is considered in Calosi and Tarozzi (2014), is discussed and
discarded in McKenzie and Muller (2017) on the grounds that it is extensionally
equivalent to mereological universalism:
In a strict sense every object is interacting with every other (...) As
such the Entanglement Proposal amounts to Universalism. Since we
hold that moderate answers to the question are to be preferred over
the extreme counterparts, this counts against the tenability of the
Entanglement Proposal (McKenzie and Muller, 2017: 240).
As I noted above, McKenzie and Muller go on to defend another physics-based
answer. According to such an answer, ψ amounts to “being in a (common)
bound state”. While the formulations of the BSA due to McKenzie and Muller
(2017), and Waechter and Ladyman (2019) differ in details the spirit is very
much the same. I will mostly follow McKenzie and Muller (2017) for a simple
reason. I find the reasons they give in favor of the BSA controversial. Waechter
and Ladyman (2019) appeal to some of those same reasons and suggest others
as well. I am prepared to concede that those other reasons do provide support
for the BSA.8 Given that I will be mostly—but not exclusively—concerned with
the reasons in favor of the BSA, rather than with details of formulation, I will
stick mostly to McKenzie and Muller (2017). That being said, the discussion
will give me the chance to deal with Waecther and Ladyman (2019) as well.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. I will first discuss the BSA and the
reasons in its favor (§2). I will then contest those reasons (§3), and compare the
BSA with a further restricted answer due to Van Inwagen, namely Fastening
(§4). This is important insofar as Van Inwagen objects to Fastening. It is
a substantive question whether the BSA is vulnerable to the same objection.
Taken together, §3 and §4 provide a critical assessment of the BSA. In the light
of the above, I go on to suggest a different general overlook on physics-based
6See especially §5.
7This is but a first stab towards a proper formulation. The entanglement answer is not
the focus of this paper, so I will leave it at that.
8I should mention one caveat that Ladyman and Waecther mention themselves. They
claim that one reason in favor of the BSA is that it is applicable, perhaps with some slight
modifications, to virtually all physical theories. They explicitly recognize that General Rela-
tivity is a difficult case, insofar as the total energy of a system is “[o]nly known for an isolated
system in certain conditions (Waechter and Ladyman (2019: 117)”—the total energy of the
system being a key notion in the very formulation of the BSA, as will be clear shortly.
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answers to SCQ which helps re-evaluate them (§5). A brief conclusion follows
(§6).
2 The BSA and Its Virtues
The core of the BSA can be summed up as follows: a set S of material objects
forms a composite object iff those material objects interact and are in a common
bound state, i.e. they are in the potential well that results from their mutual
interaction.9 A bound state is a state where the constituent objects have a
potential energy that is greater in absolute value than their kinetic energy.10
Non-bound states are sometimes referred to as scattering states. Restricting our
attention to potentials that go to zero at infinity, the criterion for distinguishing
between bound and scattering states can be roughly phrased as follows:
Bound State⇒ Es < 0
Scattering State⇒ Es ≥ 0
(1)
where Es is the (expectation-value of the) energy of the physical system s—e.g.,
a particle (Griffiths, 1995: 51-52), or a composite system.
Without entering nitpicking technicalities, a little more precision will be useful.
I follow McKenzie and Muller (2017) almost verbatim. Let S be a non-empty
set of material objects, let Comp(S, x) stand for: “The objects in S compose
object x”, and, finally, let x v y stand for: “Object x is part of y”. Then:
BSA1. If S contains a single object, then:
Comp(S, x) iff S = {x} (2)
BSA2 If S contains at least two distinct objects, then:
Comp(S, x) iff ∀y ∈ S (y v x) ∧ Ex < 0 (3)
Informally, condition (3) says that (i) every y ∈ S is part of x, and (ii)
the total energy of the system x is less than 0, that is, the members of S
are in common bound state.
Direct Part x is a direct part of y—x vd y—iff there is a set S such that the
objects in S compose y, and contain x:
x vd y iff ∃S(Comp(S, y) ∧ x ∈ S) (4)
9McKenzie and Muller (2017: 234).
10For a more accurate statement see Waechter and Ladyman (2019). (Some of) the details
of the formulation do not matter for the following discussion, so I will stick to the simpler—if
less rigorous—formulation here.
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Part x is part of y iff there is a finite sequence of direct parts that begins with
x and ends with y:
x v y iff ∃i1, ..., in : x vd i1... vd ...in vd y (5)
The parts that arise for i ≥ 1 are called Indirect Parts. I will use x vi y for
such a case. This exhausts the core of the BSA. BSA1 and BSA2 provide the
answer to SCQ, McKenzie and Muller contend, whereas Direct Part and Part
allow us to recover parthood and other mereological notions (e.g. proper part,
overlap and so on)—via the usual mereological definitions.
Before going over the reasons in favor of the BSA, it is worth noting that McKen-
zie and Muller do not seem to take composition (Comp) as a primitive, as they
explicitly define it in in terms of v. They go on to define v in terms of Comp.
This might be problematic. As of now, I just want to point out that they have
three different notions of parthood, i.e., v, vd and vi, one of which figures
twice: once in the definition of Comp, and once as defined in Part. I will return
to all this in §3.
Let us then move on to discuss the reasons in favor of the BSA, or its
“virtues” as I shall call them. McKenzie and Muller (2017) lists four of them,
two of which are discussed by Waechter and Ladyman (2019) as well. I shall
label them (i) Moderation, Conservativeness, and Extensional Adequacy, (ii)
Precision, (iii) Simplicity, and (iv) Parsimony.11
Moderation, Conservativeness, and Extensional Adequacy. The first
virtue of BSA is its moderation. BSA is a moderate answer to SCQ.
Some, but not all material objects are in a bound state. Thus some sets
of material objects, but not every non-empty set, compose something,
contra nihilisim and universalism respectively. Given that
[C]ommon sense will always prefer moderate answers to the
Question (...), [i]nsofar as congruence to common sense judg-
ments count as a reason in favor of an answer to the Question
(McKenzie and Muller, 2017: 236)
this counts as a reason in favor of the BSA. In effect, the proposal is in
line with (some) common sense judgments about composite objects. An
hydrogen atom is sanctioned as a bona-fide composite object, whereas a
trout-turkey—i.e. the “mereological fusion” of the undetached front half
of a trout and the undetached back half of a turkey—is not.12 Thus,
the first reason seems to be one of moderation and conservativeness: the
BSA is conservative insofar as it aligns with common-sense moderate judg-
ments about composition, judgments that are “honed through immersion
in physical science” (McKenzie and Muller, 2017: 235). Relatedly, La-
dyman and Weachter (2019) claims that the BSA provides a moderate
11I follow the order in McKenzie and Muller (2017). Labels are mine.
12The trout-turkey example is from Lewis (1991).
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answer to the SCQ that is extensionally adequate. In particular, Waechter
and Ladyman (2019) claims that
[O]ur account is extensionally adequate. All ordinary composite
objects included in the Swadesh list comprise (chains of) bound
states (Ladyman and Waecher, 2019: 120).
The Swadesh list is a list of words that have cognates in virtually all
linguistic communities.13. Many such words refer to ordinary composite
objects. I take it that this “Swadesh list” argument is relevantly similar
to the conservativeness argument above, so that it is warranted to discuss
them together.
Precision. Both McKenzie and Muller (2017) and Waechter and Ladyman
(2019) note that there is an influential argument in the literature to the
point that every moderate answer to SCQ entails metaphysical indeter-
minacy or vagueness, rather than less worrisome forms of indeterminacy,
such as epistemic or semantical indeterminacy.14 By contrast, the BSA
offers a sharp criterion for composition. in effect, a set of objects compose
iff those objects are in a common bound state. This ultimately boils down
to (1), which offers, upon inspection, a precise, non-vague criterion.
Simplicity. The BSA is simple insofar as it offers the very same criterion of
composition for different kinds of material objects. No matter whether
fundamental particles, molecules, mid-size dry goods, or planets are at
stake, the BSA will always tell the same story: they compose something
iff they are in a common bound-state. Compare this with some other
moderate answers, e.g. the answer Van Inwagen calls Series. Here is Van
Inwagen:
[W]e might (...) postulat[e] a sequence or hierarchy of multi-
grade bonding relations R1, R2, ..., Rn, each of which can, for
certain relata but not all relata, be the relation that binds those
relata together to form a composite object. More formally we
could try to this by constructing an answer to the SCQ that is
for this form:
Series: (∃y the xs compose y)15 if and only if
13See e.g. Swadesh (1971: 283). The final list contains 100 words. Some examples that
are relevant in the context at hand include: animal, bark, belly, berry, bird, bone, child, dog,
ear, earth, egg, eye, father, feather, flower, grass, hand, head, heart, leaf, mother, mountain,
mouth, neck, nose, road, rope, seed, stick, stone, tail, tooth, tree, woman, worm
14See e.g. Lewis (1986) and Sider (2001). This is supposed to be especially harmful for it
will eventually lead to indeterminacy in numerical sentences, i.e. sentences that only contain
logical vocabulary and identity.
15Van Inwagen uses plural-logic rather than set-theory.
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the xs are F1 and stand in R1, or the xs are F2 and stand in
R2, or..., or the xs are Fn and stand in Rn (Van Inwagen, 1990:
63).
According to Series different relations will account for composition of
different kinds of objects. Fundamental particles, molecules, mid-size dry-
goods, and planets will compose atoms, cells, cathedrals, and planetary
systems by instantiating very different relations. The simplicity that is
lost in a disjunctive answer like Series is retained in the BSA. Other
things being equal, disjunctive moderate answers are less simple than non-
disjunctive ones. Other things being equal, we should prefer the latter.
Parsimony. It is widely agreed that parthood has some formal features, e.g.
it is widely agreed that it is a partial order. Usually these formal features
are assumed axiomatically.16 But, given the BSA, they need not be. In
effect, Reflexivity and Transitivity (at least) can be proven. Reflexivity
follows from Part and BSA1.
17 Transitivity follows from Part.18 Insofar
as these features of the parthood relation need not be further axiomatic
assumptions, the BSA is parsimonious.
3 Measure for Measure
There is no denying that the virtues of the BSA are attractive. But how vir-
tuous is the BSA, really? In the following sections I will attempt to evaluate
the“measure” of the aforementioned virtues. Unfortunately, at a closer scrutiny,
the BSA will turn out to be less virtuous than it first appears. But then again,
who isn’t?19
16Along with some supplementation principles. For arguments in this direction see e.g.
Simons (1987), Varzi (2016), and Cotnoir and Varzi (Forthcoming). Waechter and Ladyman
(2019) suggests that one of the reasons in favor of the BSA is that it vindicates supplemen-
tation. However, it should be noted that their argument, if correct, shows that the BSA
vindicates one of the weakest supplementation axioms, known in the literature as Weak Com-
pany—see Varzi (2016). However, this is usually viewed as too weak to pin down a parthood
relation.
17Given BSA1, for every x, Comp({x} , x). Thus, by Part, x v x.
18Suppose x v y and y v z. By Part ∃i1, ..., in : x vd i1... @d ...in @d y, and ∃i∗1, ..., i∗n :
y vd i∗1... vd ...i∗n @d z. Hence, x vd i1... vd ....i∗n vd z. Thus, x v z.
19The BSA has further limitations I am not going to discuss. First, it only applies to material
objects. It simply does not apply to e.g., abstract objects or even to spacetime regions. Also,
it applies—at least at first sight—only to physically possible worlds. I am not going to discuss
such limitations because proponents of the BSA explicitly want to restrict their attention to
composition of physical objects in physically possible worlds—see e.g., McKenzie and Muller
(2017: 233) and Waecther and Ladyman (2019: 108). Whether such restriction is warranted
is another matter. Thanks to an anonymous referee here.
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3.1 Measuring Moderation, Conservativeness, and Exten-
sional Adequacy
The BSA is a moderate answer to the SCQ. This much is indisputable. What
I want to dispute is its conservativeness, i.e. its alignment with common-sense
judgments about composition and, relatedly, its extensional adequacy. I will
work under the assumption that conservativeness with respect to common-sense
is a virtue of a prospect moderate answer to the SCQ. In effect, McKenzie and
Muller explicitly consider such an assumption. And Waechter and Ladyman
(2019) provides a defense of ordinary objects—though it should be admitted
that their use of “ordinary” is philosophically sophisticated. Now, I suspect
that when it comes to its alignment with common-sense judgments, the BSA is,
on the one hand, too restrictive, and, on the other, too permissive.
The BSA is too restrictive insofar as it rules out several material objects that
common-sense judgments sanction as bona-fide objects. McKenzie and Muller
offer one example themselves: suits. The jacket and the trousers of a tailored
suit fail to be in a common bound-state, hence they do not compose the suit,
under the BSA. To see this note that, roughly speaking, a bound-state is a
state in which parts remain relatively close, i.e. at relative spatial proximity,
instead of being separated by an arbitrary large spatial distance. By contrast,
the trousers and the jacket can be arbitrarily far apart—the same holds for the
other alleged counterexamples mentioned below. McKenzie and Muller reply as
follows:
[O]ur judgment that trousers and jacket are part of a suit is conven-
tional (...); and when the composition is conventional, mereological
proposals need not cover it (McKenzie and Muller, 2017: 240).
But it’s not just suits. Bikinis do not exist. Single volumes of the Encyclo-
pedia Britannica exist, but the Encyclopedia does not. Cups, spoons, teapots
exist, but the tea-service does not. You thought you wanted to buy a new deck
of poker-cards, but you really can’t. The cards exist but the deck does not.
Other more controversial composite objects turn out not to exist: swarms and
flocks, schools and herds, fleets and cavalries.
To be sure, those who endorse the BSA can maintain that in every such case
there is a plurality of objects. But the question is whether there is a composite
object that those pluralities compose. Are we to say that all judgments as to
whether composition occurs in these cases are conventional as well? The point
I want to make is modest. I am not saying that an argument for conventionality
of composition cannot be given. I am just claiming that this is exactly where an
argument is needed, rather than simple assertion. As far as I can see, proponents
of the BSA have not provided such an argument. Surely it cannot be, on pain of
begging the question, that the cards in the deck, the birds in the flock, the fishes
in the school do not compose because they are not in a common bound-state.
We can at this point put further pressure on the BSA. As I was saying, this is
exactly where an argument is needed. Now, common-sense seems to provide an
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argument that, at least in some cases, the pluralities just mentioned do com-
pose. When you go buy a suit or a bikini, common-sensical judgments seem to
underwrite the claim that you are buying one object, a composite one indeed,
rather than a plurality of objects. The same is true for my copy of Goethe’s
Faust which came in two volumes. One can even look beyond common sense.
Consider two entangled particles that are arbitrarily far apart. Entanglement
can be thought of as sufficient—if not necessary—for composition. If so, the
BSA will deliver the wrong result, insofar as the entangled particles are not in
a bound-state—I will return to this in §5.20
On the other hand, the BSA seems too permissive, vis-à-vis common-sense
judgments. Consider the mereological monster from the previous section, i.e.
the trout-turkey. The trout-turkey does not exist, according to the BSA. Yet,
the trout-turkey-earth, i.e. the mereological fusion of the front half of the trout,
the back half of the turkey, and the entire earth does. This is because all ter-
restrial objects are in the gravitational well of the earth. In effect, think of any
fusion of gerry-mandered, scattered parts of distinct terrestrial objects. Take
any such fusion F whatsoever. F does not exist, yet any Fearth, i.e. the fusion of
F and the earth, does.21 Foes of mereological universalism often complain about
fusions such as F on the grounds that they do not exhibit any kind of natural
unity, organic cohesiveness, or the likes. The same complaint—it seems—applies
to Fearths. I don’t find these complaints particularly compelling. I love mon-
sters. In fact, they do not look like monsters to me. Yet, these complaints are
often voiced as coming from the common-sense perspective. If alignment with
common-sense judgments is what we are after, I am afraid the BSA does not
score that well.
It should be clear how the previous considerations bear on the fate of the
extensional adequacy of the BSA, in the light of Waechter and Ladyman’s
“Swadish list” argument. The point is that the Swadish list does not contain
the list of all ordinary composite objects. And even if it did, it would probably
not contain each and every Fearth. But the BSA delivers that every Fearth
exists. Its pronouncements are therefore arguably not extensionally equivalent
to an “enriched” Swadish list. If this enriched Swadesh list is the paradigm
against which extensional adequacy has to be measured, the BSA can be found
wanting.
20Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me on this point.
21One might object as follows. Once there is a bound-state, it is the whole bound-state we
should look at. We cannot pick arbitrarily any subset of objects in that state, and then claim
they compose something. Now, the fusion of all terrestrial objects, call it F*, and the earth,
are indeed in a common bound-state. So, it is that bound state we should look at, not just
a fusion of some terrestrial objects and the earth. It is only Fearth* (the fusion of F* and
the earth) we should be interested in. I can think of two replies. First, Fearth* is itself a
mereological monster in the light of moderate answers of the SCQ. Second, any fusion F of
subsets of parts of terrestrial objects and of the earth are in a common bound state as well,
even if it is not the same bound state that F* and the earth are in. Thus, according to the
BSA it would still be the case that any Fearth exist.
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3.2 Measuring Precision
Once again, it is indisputable that the BSA gives a precise, non-vague moderate
answer to the SCQ. The question is whether precision per se is really a virtue
that is so hard to obtain. I contend that precision in itself is quite easy. And is
something really a virtue, if it is so easy? What I am really challenging here is
not the measure of precision, as much as its worthiness. Any moderate answer
to the SCQ takes the following form:
∀S(∃x(x ∈ S) ∧ ψ(S)↔ ∃z(Comp(S, z)) (6)
where ¬∀S(ψ(S)) ∧ ¬∀S(¬ψ(S)) holds.22 (6) claims—roughly—that criterion
ψ provides necessary and sufficient conditions for members of S to compose
z. Pick any non-vague ψ whatsoever, plug it into (6), and the result will be a
precise, non-vague moderate answer to the SCQ. Suppose ψ is “having negative
charge”. The corresponding moderate answer to the SCQ will be as precise
as the BSA. Unfortunately it will entail that only things with negative charge
undergo composition. Or suppose that ψ is the ancestral relation of topological
connection. Insofar as topological connection is not vague, neither is the result-
ing moderate answer. Let us restrict our attention to binary fusions, i.e. fusions
of two (atomic) parts. Then, the following is—according both to McKenzie and
Muller’s and to Waechter and Ladyman’s own standards—a precise moderate
answer to the SCQ:
x ◦ y ↔ ∃w(Comp({x, y} , w) (7)
where ◦ is mereological overlap, defined as usual:
x ◦ y iff ∃z(z v x ∧ z v y) (8)
Insofar as v is not vague, ◦ is not vague. Once again, (7) is precise, yet it
is not plausible, for it states that two things compose another iff they overlap.
All these examples teach the same lesson. Precision per se is not difficult to
get. The real difficulty, and thus the real value, lies in specifying a precise ψ
that also meets further desiderata for composition we might care about. In
particular, if we want our restricted answer to the SCQ to align with common
sense judgments, the task is to put forward a precise ψ that at the same time
sanctions commonsensical judgments about composition. To put it differently:
it is the combination of conservativeness and precision that should be considered
a virtue (for moderate answers). And I already made my case about the “real
conservativeness” of the BSA.
3.3 Measuring Simplicity
The BSA exhibits a certain simplicity (or unity), especially when compared
with moderate disjunctive answers like Series. But there are other dimensions
22I am slightly abusing terminology here, as the criterion ψ applies to the members of S,
perhaps collectively, rather than to the set S.
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of Simplicity that should be considered, beside that of not being disjunctive.
After all, when I discussed Simplicity I did claim that, “other things being
equal”, we should prefer non disjunctive answers. Are other things equal? One
might argue they are not. For example, the BSA has two distinct conditions
for composition—reflected in the distinction between BSA1 and BSA2. One
condition is given for a singleton set, and a different condition is given for a set
that contains at least two members. Surely, one might insist, a single condition
would be simpler. In fact, we should strive for a single condition. If it is a
necessary and sufficient criterion for composition we are after, and this is in fact
the heart and soul of every moderate answer to the SCQ, shouldn’t it apply
to all cases of composition, including the limit case of a singleton set? Every
thing—atoms included—counts as a mereological fusion of itself. Every thing—
atoms included—self-composes, so to speak. And in fact, plenty of moderate
answers to the SCQ do not need to distinguish cases of self-composition from
other cases. Take the (admittedly unsatisfactory) answer in (7). Generalizing,
we can say that members of S compose something iff they stand in the ancestral
of the overlap relation—as defined in (8). Call this the Overlap answer to the
SCQ. The Overlap answer does not need to distinguish between sets Si with
one or more members.
But does the BSA really need to distinguish the two cases? Could we just
simply abandon BSA1, and stick with BSA2 only? That would be a welcome
simplicity. In the end, if the hallmark of composition is being in a bound-state,
shouldn’t this apply, in all its simplicity, to cases when just one object is in-
volved? Shouldn’t we say that an object self-composes iff it is in a bound-state?
Unfortunately we cannot. For there are simple physical systems that only admit
of scattering states. A free particle, for instance, only admits of scattering states
(Griffiths, 1995: 52). If we were to drop BSA1 in the name of simplicity, we
would have to admit that free-particles do not self-compose. As a consequence,
Parthood—as defined in (4) and (5)—would not be Reflexive. For in general, it
would not be true that for every x, Comp({x} , x).23 Look at it this way. The
argument above—if it is right—shows that according to the BSA “being in a
(common) bound-state” is the hallmark for composition only for those particular
cases where more than one object is involved. For cases where only one object
is involved, “being in a (common) bound-state” does not play any role. One
might at this point ask whether being in a “being in a (common) bound-state”
is the hallmark of composition after all. I anticipate the following reply: the
only interesting cases of composition are cases in which two or more objects are
involved. We should not dwell too much on limit cases of self-composition. Now,
there is some truth to the point that the focus of our epistemic interests is on the
cases in which two or more objects compose. But is there a metaphysically sig-
nificant difference there? Admittedly, there are some metaphysical differences.
For example, if something self-composes, it does not compose a further entity.
But limit cases of composition are still cases of composition, one might contend.
23See footnote 17.
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In any event, it is enough for my present aims that I argued for the follow-
ing point: (i) either we keep both BSA1 and BSA2, thus detracting significantly
from the overall simplicity of the BSA, or (ii) we abandon BSA1, we restore full-
fledged simplicity but we lose self-composition, and along with that, Reflexivity.
There is a final dimension of simplicity one might worry about, although
“simplicity” might not be the right label for it. As I noted already, McKenzie
and Muller have three different notions of parthood: Parthood, Direct Parthood
and Indirect Parthood. As a matter of fact, they really don’t have three, but
rather four. For they take Parthood as primitive in their definition of Comp,
and then go on to define Parthood as a disjunction of two further defined no-
tions, Indirect and Direct Parthood.24 This is problematic: what guarantees do
we have have that the primitive notion of Parthood and the defined notion of
Parthood are at least extensionally equivalent—if they are meant to be the same
relation at least? One can push the point that this proliferation of parthood
relations detract from the simplicity of the proposal.25 Now, I am not going
to press this line of argument too much. This is because I think there is no
need to take Parthood as primitive if one were to endorse the BSA. This also
seems to be the line taken by Waechter and Ladyman (2019), insofar as their
characterization of the BSA does not mention the parthood relation. But as
I shall now contend, this is important. If we define the notion of Mereological
Parthood26 in terms of Comp, this turns out to be Direct Parthood. And this
leads me to my final point: the measure of parsimony.
3.4 Measuring Parsimony
The BSA is allegedly parsimonious insofar as some formal features of the rela-
tion of parthood can be proved, rather than assumed axiomatically. McKenzie
and Muller focus on Reflexivity and Transitivity. The argument in the previous
section has some bearing on Reflexivity. It need not be assumed axiomatically
only insofar as one assumes BSA1, and distinguish two cases of composition,
self-composition and composition of two (or more) objects. This detracts from
24The reader can verify that Parthood can be defined using that disjunction.
25This raises a further worry. Van Inwagen is explicit that any answer to SCQ should not use
any mereological vocabulary. By contrast, v is mentioned explicitly here. I am not pushing
this point mainly for two reasons. First, as I mention in the main text, I believe there is a
way to phrase the BSA that does not use v, nor any other mereological vocabulary for that
matter. Second, it has been argued that van Inwagen’s constraints are unnecessary stringent
in this respect. For instance, Markosian writes:
Van Inwagen lays down a similar, but more stringent, restriction on what can
count as an interesting answer to SCQ. He in effect stipulates that answers to
SCQ are to be instances of (S1) [the alleged answer to the SCQ] that contain
no mereological terms after their occurrences of “iff”. (See Material Beings,
pp. 30-31.) Thus it is possible for a sentence to qualify as a non-trivial answer
to SCQ on my account, but fail to qualify as an answer to SCQ at all on van
Inwagen’s account (Markosian, 1998: 244).
Thanks to an anonymous referee here.
26As will shortly be clear, the qualification “Mereological” is crucial in what follows.
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Simplicity. Or so I argued. In effect, one can make a case that BSA1 is assumed
only to guarantee Reflexivity.27 Assuming BSA1 has the same costs that as-
suming Reflexivity directly has. There is actually no parsimony here. Let us
move then to Transitivity.
In what follows it will be crucial to qualify parthood as mereological whenever
needed—the reason will be obvious in a moment. Thus, at the risk of sounding
repetitive, I will indeed explicitly add that qualification when necessary. The
relation of mereological parthood axiomatized in (classical) mereology is usually
taken as a primitive, and the notion of mereological fusion is defined in terms
of mereological parthood as follows:
Fus(x, S) =df ∀y(y ∈ S)→ (y v x) ∧ ∀z(z v x→ ∃w(w ∈ S ∧ z ◦ w)) (9)
Informally x is a fusion of (the members of a) set S iff every member of S
is a mereological part of x, and every mereological part of x overlaps at least a
member of S. But the two notions are inter-definable. Starting with a notion
of Fusion, in mereology we define mereological parthood as follows:28
x v y iff ∃S(Fus(y, S ∪ {x}) (10)
That is to say that x is a mereological part of y iff there is a set S such that
y is the fusion of the members of S and x. Taking Fus and Comp as mutual
converses, x is a mereologiocal part of y iff there is a set S such that the members
of S ∪ {x} compose y. And naturally x ∈ S ∪ {x}. Hence, what (10) claims is
that x is a mereological part of y iff there is a set S∗ such that the objects in S∗
compose y and contains x. This is verbatim the notion of Direct Parthood. In
other words, the argument above shows that the usual definition of mereological
parthood given in terms of fusion in mereology is what McKenzie and Muller
call Direct Parthood vd, not what they define in Part v. So, the question of
whether we can prove that mereological parthood is transitive, boils down to the
question of whether vd is transitive. This is problematic because, as McKenzie
and Muller themselves point out, it turns out that vd is not transitive after
all. Ladyman and Weachter (2019) are explicit about this. Let me flesh out in
some details an example McKenzie and Muller briefly mention. Three quarks
q1, q2, q3 compose a proton p, for they all lie in a common potential well—hence
they are in a common bound-state:
Comp({q1, q2, q3} , p) (11)
From (11) we get that, for every qi, qi vd p. The proton p and an electron
e compose an Hydrogen atom H, insofar as they are both, once again, in a
common potential well:
27Van Inwagen himself is explicit in this regard. See Van Inwagen (1990: 82; footnote 29).
28See e.g. Van Inwagen, (1987: 25).
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Comp({p, e} , H) (12)
From (12) we derive that p vd H. Transitivity will dictate that, for each
qi, qi vd H. That is, applying (4)—or (10)—there exists a set S such that
Comp(S, y), and qi ∈ S, for each qi. Clearly S = {q1, q2, q3, e}. Unfortunately
H does not compose S according to the BSA, for its members are not in common
potential well, i.e. they are not in a common bound-state. Hence Transitivity of
vd fails.29 In effect, the relation McKenzie and Muller define in Part is basically
the transitive closure of vd. It is no wonder that it is transitive. The transitive
closure of any relation is transitive.
This last argument can be generalized. The general point is that it is dubious
that we should ascribe the merits of the alleged derivability of the formal profile
of some parthood relation to the physical details behind the BSA. To argue
for this claim, let me introduce a construction due to Fine (2010: 567-568).
Suppose we start from a very general—and flexible—composition operation
∑
.∑
is flexible insofar as it can take any number of argument, 0, 1, ..., n, for any n.
Then we can define the notion of component, and parthood* —the counterparts
of McKenzie and Muller’s Direct Part and Part—as follows:
Component. x is a component of y iff y is the result of applying
∑
to x and
(possibly) some other object.
Parthood*. x is part of y iff there is a sequence of objects x1, ..., xn, n > 0,
for which x = x1, y = xn, and xi is a component of xi+1 for i = 1, ..., n−1.
Then, independently of any physical details about
∑
, parthood* is reflexive
and transitive.30 This shows that details about “being in a bound-state” are
irrelevant when it comes to prove some formal features of some particular part-
like relation—like parthood*. They simply follow from taking an operation of
general composition as primitive (and basic), rather than a relation such as
parthood. This is important especially in the case of McKenzie and Muller for,
as should by now be clear, they take Parthood as both a primitive and a defined
notion. The point here is that if one takes it as it is defined in Part—and one
should take it as a defined notion if one wants to derive some formal features,
rather than assuming them axiomatically—one ends up with Component or
Direct Parthood. In effect, as Fine himself remarks, the notion of mereological
parthood is equivalent to that of component, rather than parthood*.31 This is
in line with the argument I offered. And, as Fine points out,
29As I mentioned already, Waechter and Ladyman (2019) agrees on the failure of transitivity.
Their argument is slightly different.
30The proofs are entirely similar to the ones in footnotes 17 and 18. Interestingly enough,




should be defined even when it
takes only one object as an argument. This will ensure Reflexivity. That is why we do need
BSA1, as I argued in the previous section.
31The argument is relevantly similar to the one I gave for McKenzie and Muller’s Direct
Part.
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[I]f part is understood as component, it would be a substantive ques-
tion whether the relation is transitive (Fine, 2010: 569).
Note that McKenzie and Muller are interested in offering an answer to the
SCQ, as it is understood in metaphysics. They are explicit:
[W]e are claiming (...) that the Bound State Proposal identifies the
sort of composition that is relevant to the Special Composition Ques-
tion discussed in metaphysics (McKenzie and Muller, 2017: 240,
italics mine).
The SCQ, as it understood in metaphysics, is cashed out in terms of compo-
nent, not of parthood*, using Fine’s terminology. Or, in McKenzie and Muller’s
terminology, it is phrased in terms of Direct Parthood. It is a substantive ques-
tion whether that relation is transitive. And it turns out, that it is not. To
conclude: the BSA can recover the Reflexivity and Transitivity of some rela-
tion in the vicinity of mereological parthood. And this is not because of some
details about bound-states, or some other physical details about composition,
but rather because of some general formal features.
But, in the end, what’s in a name? That which we call a rose by any other
name would smell as sweet.32 And saying that a leg is a tail doesn’t make it
a tail.33 Calling parthood a relation in the vicinity of mereological parthood,
does not make that relation mereological parthood, as it is understood in the
SCQ. And as far as that relation goes, we cannot prove that it is transitive. In
fact, given the BSA, we can prove that it is not.
4 The BSA and Fastening
While going through some possible moderate answers to the SCQ, Van Inwagen
discusses what he calls Fastening :
[S]uppose that two objects (...) are so arranged that, among all the
many sequences in which forces of arbitrary direction and magnitude
might be applied to either or both of them, at most only a few
would be able to separating them (...). Then let us say that these
two objects are fastened to each other, or, simply, fastened. (...)
Now the concept of “fastening” is pretty vague, and my attempts
to explain it could probably be improved upon (Van Inwagen, 1987:
30-31).34
32Romeo and Juliet ; II, II: 1.2.
33Attributed to A. Lincoln. See Reminiscences of Abraham Lincoln by distinguished men
of his time, collected and edited by Allen Thorndike Rice (1853-1889). New York: Harper
and Brothers Publishers, 1909: 242.
34See also Van Inwagen (1990: 56-57).
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On the face of it, the BSA seems fairly analogous to Fastening. In effect,
it looks as a way of using physics to make Fastening more precise, to improve
Van Inwagen’s original formulation, as he himself would put it. This is because
scattering states are exactly those states in which particular forces are respon-
sible for “separating” components.35
The analogy is worth pointing out for different reasons. First because, to my
knowledge, it has not been pointed out.36 Second, if borne out, it can be used
to reply to an objection due to Markosian (1998). Markosian writes:
[I]n addition to the difficulties spelled out above for each of the
versions of Fastenation, there is a general difficulty facing all these
views. The general difficulty is that we don’t know what it means
to say that some x-s are fastened together (Markosian, 1998: 225,
italics added).
In the light of this general objection, Markosian contends, the expression
“the x-s are fastened together” should be taken as a primitive. And this is a
great theoretical cost. But, if the analogy holds, perhaps we can simply reply
that we do know what it means for the x-s to be fastened together: it means
that they are in a common bound-state. And that latter notion can be defined
as in (1).
Finally, the analogy is worth pointing out because Van Inwagen objects to Fas-
tening on the grounds that it delivers unwanted results. If you and I shake
hands and we suddenly become paralyzed we become fastened. Yet, according
to Van Inwagen
[O]ur paralysis has not added to the furniture of earth: it has merely
diminished its capacity to be re-arranged. Therefore, composition is
not, primarily, a matter of things being fastened to one another. This
is not to say that there may not be some cases in which certain things
come to compose something at the moment they become fastened
to another another; it is to say that the mere fact that they have
become fastened is not a complete explanation of the generation of
th new thing that they compose (Van Inwagen, 1987: 31-32, italics
added).37
Following Markosian (1998), let me call this the “Paralyzed Handshakers”
objection. In the light of the analogy above, consider the following argument.
Suppose a speck of galactic matter is caught in the gravitational well of the
earth. Does this add to the furniture of the universe or merely diminished its
capacity to be re-arranged? Is this the complete explanation of the generation
of the new thing that the speck of matter and the earth compose?
35To be fair, it is not Van Inwagen’s own notion of Fastening, for Van Inwagen requires
fastened objects to be topologically connected.
36Neither McKenzie and Muller (2017), nor Waechter and Ladyman (2019) mention Fas-
tening.
37See also Van Inwagen (1990: 58).
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There seems to be a worry here. Let me phrase it this way. Either the BSA is
relevantly similar to Fastening or it is not. If it is not, an account of the relevant
difference is owed. If it is, then one has to address the Paralyzed Handshaker
objection—or my galactic speck of matter variant. Either the objection was
compelling in the first case, or it was not. If it was not, then we should have
gone with Fastening all along. The BSA is just a way to make Fastening precise.
However, one would need to motivate why the objection was not compelling. I
know of no such discussion. If the objection was compelling against Fastening
but it is not compelling against the BSA, then, once again, one needs to explain
why, especially under the assumption at work here, namely that the BSA and
Fastening are relevantly similar. Let me lay my cards on the table. I don’t
think that these difficulties are insuperable. As a matter of fact, I will suggest
some strategies myself in the next section. Yet, it seems fair to say that more
work needs to be done. This concludes my critical assessment of the BSA.
5 Mereological Pluralism
In the light of the above, one may wonder whether I think the BSA should
simply be rejected. I am actually more sympathetic than one might infer from
the arguments in the previous sections. Here I want to suggest different ways
to look at the BSA—and other physics-based answers—that sidestep many of
the worries raised above. I should be explicit upfront and confess that I will not
provide an argument to the point that these are the only ways, the best ways,
or the correct ways of looking at the BSA. I will limit myself to putting some
suggestions on the table.
It is perhaps instructive to start by going back to the entanglement answer to
the SCQ. As I briefly pointed out in §2, the entanglement answer and the BSA
are not extensionally equivalent. The easiest way to appreciate it is to note that
two entangled particles need not be in a bound state. Now, one can push the
point that quantum mechanics need to treat (multi-particle)38 entangled sys-
tems as composite systems to account for experimentally detectable correlations.
In other words, one might treat entanglement as sufficient for composition.39
This would provide an alleged physics-based counterexample to the BSA. It also
seems that now we have two physics-based answers that deliver different results.
I suggest that this is significant, and can be taken at face value. Perhaps the
moral to be drawn from the discussion above is that physics provides us with
different ways to build wholes out of some components, so to speak. Let me
expand on this. As far as I can see, there are—at least—two different ways to
develop the suggestion.
The first option is that we distinguish simple mereological composition from
38See Hasegawa (2012) for a case of one-particle entanglement. Note that this is not a
problem for the proposal we are discussing here, for the proposal has it that entanglement is
only sufficient for composition.
39For an argument see e.g. Schaffer (2010), and Calosi and Tarozzi (2014).
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ψ-composition and we define the latter in terms of the former:
ψ-composition: A set S of material objects ψ-composes a further object x iff
the members of S mereologically compose x and ψ(S).
Mereological composition is necessary but not sufficient for ψ-composition.
Different ψ will deliver different kinds of composition, different kinds of wholes
and different kinds of parts. Suppose ψ is “being in a common bound-state”.40
Then we will get a notion of Bound-composition, a notion of Bound-whole, and
a notion of Bound-part. Or, suppose that ψ is “being in an entangled state”.
Then we will get a notion of Entanglement-composition, a notion of entangled-
whole, and a notion of entangled part.
This suggestion will not help answering the SCQ, for the SCQ is crucially under-
stood in terms of mereological composition. Yet, it will help with some worries
raised in §3. For one, depending on ψ, alignment with common-sense judgments
should arguably not be considered a desideratum in the first place. Some such
conditions are clearly beyond the scope of common-sense judgments. It will
also help answering some worries about the formal profile of parthood relations.
One can wholeheartedly accept that mereological parthood is indeed transitive,
whereas the defined notion of ψ-parthood is not. But this is far from problem-
atic. Whether ψ-parthood is transitive will depend on the exact ψ.41 Finally, it
should be noted that this can help to assuage—if not undermine—the Paralyzed
Handshakers objection, or my speck of galactic matter counterpart. The worry
was that the BSA seemed incapable to explain the “addition” to the furniture of
nature, rather than the diminished capacity of rearranging some of its already
existing items. In the case at hand, one would say that the BSA does provide
an explanation of the fact that an already existing mereological sum becomes a
new kind of whole, namely a bound-whole.
Now, the option I just discussed is a somewhat conservative option. There is
a second, more radical one, that can be put forward. According to such an op-
tion, the arguments above suggest genuine mereological pluralism. Mereological
pluralism is the view that
[T]here are different basic ways in which one object may, intuitively,
be part of another (Fine, 2010: 562, italics added).
Or, as McDaniel puts it:
[T]here are many fundamental parthood relations (McDaniel, 2009:
254, italics added).
40Note that we will not recover the BSA as defined by McKenzie and Muller (2017). The
proposal at hand is strictly speaking stronger then theirs, in that it entails theirs but is not
entailed by it.
41This should be expected. Perhaps this is best appreciated in the context of set theory:
the union of two transitive relations need not be transitive.
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The thought here is that there are different parthood relations that are
not definable in terms of mereological parthood.42 This is where mereological
pluralism departs from ψ-composition above, for the latter holds that any
ψ-parthood relation is definable in terms of mereological parthood. As Fine
points out, from the fact that pluralists hold that different notions of parthood
cannot be defined in terms of mereological parthood, it doesn’t follow that they
cannot be defined at all. In effect, a way to do so is exactly the one I presented
in §3.4. One can start with different operations of composition
∑
that cannot
be inter-defined, and then go on to define different notions of Component and
Parthood∗. In other words: one can endorse both compositional pluralism and
mereological pluralism.
As far as I can see, this proposal will have the same consequences as the
previous one vis-à-vis the SCQ, the alignment to common sense and, mutatis
mutandis,43 the response to the Paralyzed Handshakers objection. The question
about the formal profile of different parthood relations is however more inter-
esting, and it is worth spending a few words on it. On the one hand, one may
hold the view that the different notions of parthood might not share the very
same formal profile. In particular some of them might be transitive, some would
not be. Bound-parthood can be then identified with McKenzie and Muller Di-
rect Parthood, and failure of transitivity would not be problematic after all.
On the other hand, one might simply insist that different notions of parthood
might well have different formal profiles, and yet, the partial ordering axioms
are constitutive of any relation that aspire to be a parthood relation. In this
case, one should then insist that the way in which a bound-part is a part is not
really given by Direct Parthood, but rather by its transitive closure, namely
the relation that McKenzie and Muller define in Part. This is reminiscent of
the discussion in Fine (2010) that focuses on an alleged notion of set-theoretic
parthood:
[I]ndeed, it may well be thought that the way in which a member is
part of a set is given, not by the membership relation itself, but by
the ancestral of the membership relation, where that is the relation
that holds between x and y when x is a member of y, or a member of
a member of y, or a member of a member of a member of y, and so
on. The way in which a member is part of a set will then indeed be
transitive, and the relation of member to set will merely correspond
to the special case in which the object is directly part of the whole
(Fine, 2010: 563).
It should be noted that the discussion above would not help McKenzie and
42Mereological pluralism has been investigated—and defended—in Grossmann (1973), Si-
mons (1987), Armstrong (1997), Johnston (2006), Koslicki (2008), McDaniel (2009), and Fine
(2010) to mention a few. The locus classicus for the opposite view, Mereological Monism, is
Lewis (1991). A recent defense is in Lando (2017).
43For instance, given that mereological composition is not necessary for Bound-composition,
there is no guarantee that there will be a pre-existing mereological sum in the case at hand.
18
Muller’s case for Parsimony. Their claim was that they could prove transitivity
of the notion of parthood that is at stake in the original SCQ. That is mereo-
logical parthood. And the suggestion at hand is exactly that bound-parthood
is not mereological parthood.
As I pointed out already, I concede that the discussion above does not provide
a fully fledged argument in favor of any of these two ways of looking at the BSA
and other physics-based answer to questions of composition in general. I am
afraid this deserves an independent scrutiny. It should be enough for now to
have laid these possibilities on the table.
6 Conclusion
To take stock. The BSA represents a much welcome development in the debate
on the physics and metaphysics of composition. On the one hand, I believe
our metaphysics should be informed by empirical sciences. On the other hand,
as I argued, at a closer look the BSA is less conservative and less simple than
expected (or desired), its precision is arguably over-rated, and its ability to get
some formal features of mereological parthood relation for free—that is, the
formal features of the specific parthood relation that is employed in cashing out
the original SCQ—is dubious. However, I also suggested different ways to look at
the proposal—and at other relevant ones—which promise to have significant and
fruitful ramifications. In particular, I suggested a less revisionary and a more
revisionary understanding of the physics-based answer(s) in question. There is a
sense in which both these understandings are card-carrying pluralist proposals.44
It should in conclusion be noted that an overall pluralistic attitude towards
composition in physics has been suggested, if not advocated, in a number of
places, for instance Healey (2013) and Ceravolo and French(MS). An echo of
such a general pluralistic attitude might be heard in this passage of Ladyman
and Ross:
[T]he wholes mentioned [in physics] (...) are hugely disparate and
(...) we have no reason to believe that an abstract composition
relation is anything other than an entrenched philosophical fetish
(Ladyman and Ross, 2007: 21).
I don’t share Ladyman and Ross’s extreme skepticism towards the “abstract
composition relation”—if this is meant to be mereological composition. Perhaps
the disparity of the wholes that we are presented with in physics calls for some
pluralism after all. Arguments in its favor will have to wait. We cannot do the
whole work at once, only some parts.
44Though, admittedly, only one qualifies as genuine mereological pluralism.
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